Philosophers and psychologists have long debated the nature of empathy (e.g., Ickes, 2003; Thompson, 2001) , and whether the capacity to share and understand other people's emotions sets humans apart from other species (e.g., de Waal, 2005) . Here, we consider empathy as a construct accounting for a sense of similarity in feelings experienced by the self and the other, without confusion between the two individuals (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Lamm, 2006) . The experience of empathy can lead to sympathy (concern for another based on the apprehension or comprehension of the other's emotional state or condition), or even personal distress (i.e., an aversive, self-focused emotional reaction to the apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional state or condition) when there is confusion between self and other. Knowledge of empathic behavior is essential for an understanding of human social and moral development (Eisenberg et al., 1994) . Furthermore, various psychopathologies are marked by empathy deficits, and a wide array of psychotherapeutic approaches stress the importance of clinical empathy as a fundamental component of treatment (Farrow & Woodruff, 2007) .
In recent years, there has been an upsurge in neuroimaging investigations of empathy. Most of these studies reflect the new approach of social neuroscience,
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which combines research designs and behavioral measures used in social psychology with neuroscience markers. Such an approach plays an important role in disambiguating competing theories in social psychology in general and in empathy-related research in particular (Decety & Hodges, 2006) . For instance, one critical question debated among social psychologists is whether perspectivetaking instructions induce empathic concern and/or personal distress, and to what extent prosocial motivation springs from self-other overlap.
In this chapter, we focus on recent social neuroscience research exploring how people respond behaviorally and neurally to the pain of others. The perception of others in painful situations constitutes an ecologically valid way to investigate the mechanisms underpinning the experience of empathy. Findings from these studies demonstrate that the mere perception of another individual in pain results, in the observer, in the activation of the neural network involved in the processing of first-hand experience of pain. This intimate overlap between the neural circuits responsible for our ability to perceive the pain of others and those underlying our own self-experience of pain supports the shared-representation theory of social cognition. This theory posits that perceiving someone else's emotion and having an emotional response or subjective feeling state both draw upon essentially the same computational processes and rely on somatosensory and motor representations. However, we argue that a complete self-other overlap can lead to personal distress and possibly be detrimental to empathic concern.
Personal distress may even result in a more egoistic motivation to reduce it, by withdrawing from the stressor, for example, thereby decreasing the likelihood of prosocial behavior (Tice et al., 2001) .
We first present the results of recent functional neuroimaging studies showing the involvement of shared neural circuits during the observation of pain in others and during the experience of pain in the self. Next, we discuss how perspective taking and the ability to differentiate the self from the other affect this sharing
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mechanism. In the final section, we examine how certain interpersonal variables modulate empathic concern and personal distress.
Shared neural circuits between self and other
It has long been suggested that empathy involves resonating with another person's unconscious affect. For instance, Basch (1983) speculated that, because their respective autonomic nervous systems are genetically programmed to respond in a similar fashion, a given affective expression by a member of a particular species can trigger similar responses in other members of that species. The view that unconscious automatic mimicry of a target generates in the observer the autonomic response associated with that bodily state and facial expression subsequently received empirical support from a variety of behavioral and physiological studies marshaled under the perception-action coupling mechanism (Preston & de Waal, 2002) . The core assumption of the perception-action model of empathy is that perceiving a target's state automatically activates the corresponding representations of that state in the observer, which in turn activates somatic and autonomic responses. The discovery of sensory-motor neurons (called mirror neurons) in the premotor and posterior parietal cortex that discharge during both the production of a given action and during the perception of the same action performed by another individual, provides the physiological mechanism for this direct link between perception and action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004 ).
Behavioral studies demonstrate that viewing facial expressions triggers similar expressions on one's own face, even in the absence of conscious recognition of the stimulus. One functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment confirmed these results by showing that when participants were required to observe or to imitate facial expressions of various emotions, increased neurodynamic activity was detected in the brain regions implicated in the facial expressions of these emotions, including the superior temporal sulcus, the anterior insula, and the amygdala, as well as specific areas of the premotor cortex (Carr et al., 2003) .
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Accumulating evidence suggests that a 'mirroring' or resonance mechanism is also at play both when one experiences sensory and affective feelings in the self and perceives them in others. Even at the level of the somatosensory cortex, seeing another's neck or face being touched elicits appropriately organized somatotopic activations in the mind of the observer (Blakemore et al., 2005) .
Robust support for the involvement of shared neural circuits in the perception of affective states comes from recent neuroimaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies. For instance, the first-hand experience of disgust and the sight of disgusted facial expressions in others both activate the anterior insula (Wicker et al., 2003) . Similarly, the observation of hand and face actions performed with an emotion engages regions that are also involved in the perception and experience of emotion and/or communication (Grosbras & Paus, 2006) . In one study, participants in the scanner received painful stimuli in some trials while in other trials simply observed a signal indicating that their partner, who was present in the same room, would receive the painful stimuli (Singer et al., 2004) . During both types of trials, the medial and anterior cingulate cortex (MCC and ACC) and the anterior insula were activated (see also Morrison et al., 2004) .
These regions contribute to the affective and motivational processing of noxious stimuli, i.e., aspects of pain that pertain to desires, urges, or impulses to avoid or terminate a painful experience. Similar results were reported in a study by Jackson, Meltzoff and Decety (2005) in which participants were shown pictures of people's hands or feet in painful or neutral everyday-life situations. Significant activation in regions involved in the affective aspects of pain processing (MCC/ACC and anterior insula) was detected but, as in Singer et al.'s (2004) study, no signal change was found in the somatosensory cortex. However, a recent TMS study did report changes in corticospinal motor representations of hand muscles in individuals observing needles penetrating hands or feet of a human model (Avenanti et al., 2005) , indicating that the observation of pain can also involve sensorimotor representations.
In summary, current neuroscientific evidence suggests that merely observing another individual in a painful situation yields responses in the neural network associated with the coding of the motivational-affective dimension of pain in oneself. On the other hand, a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies indicates that this overlap is not complete (Jackson, Rainville & Decety, 2006) . Both in the insula and the cingulate cortex, the perception of pain in others results in more rostral activations than does the first-hand experience of pain.
Also, vicariously instigated activations in the pain matrix are not necessarily specific to the emotional experience of pain, but to other processes such as somatic monitoring, negative stimulus evaluation, and the selection of appropriate skeletomuscular movements of aversion. Thus, the shared neural representations in the affective-motivational part of the pain matrix might not be specific to the sensory qualities of pain, but instead be associated with more general survival mechanisms such as aversion and withdrawal.
The discovery that the observation of pain in others activates brain structures involved in negative emotional experiences has important implications for the question of whether observing another's plight will result in empathic concern or personal distress. Appraisal theory views emotions as resulting from the appraisal of physiological responses triggered by an external or internal stimulus (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001) . Perceiving the emotions of others is a powerful instigator of physiological responses, leading to distinct changes in both the central and the autonomic nervous system. Interestingly, a higher linkage between observer and target in psychophysiological indicators such as heart rate and electrodermal activity predicts better understanding of the target's emotional
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state (Levenson & Ruef, 1992) . Note also that parts of the insula and the MCC active during the observation of pain in others contribute to the monitoring of bodily changes, such as visceral and somatic responses. Hence, it is plausible that depending upon whether these responses are attributed to the self or to the other, they might result in more or fewer other-vs. self-oriented emotions.
Perspective-taking, self-other awareness, and empathy
There is general consensus among theorists that the ability to adopt and entertain the psychological perspective of others has a number of important consequences. Well-developed perspective-taking abilities allow us to overcome our usual egocentrism and tailor our behaviors to others' expectations (Davis et al., 1996) . Further, successful role-taking has been linked to moral reasoning and altruism (Batson et al., 1991) . Using mental imagery to take the perspective of another is a powerful way to place oneself in the situation or emotional state of that person. Mental imagery not only enables us to see the world of our conspecifics through their eyes or in their shoes, but may also result in similar sensations as the other person's (Decety & Grèzes, 2006) .
Social psychology has for a long time been interested in the distinction between imagining the other and imagining oneself, and in particular in the emotional and motivational consequences of these two perspectives. A number of relevant studies show that focusing on another's feelings may evoke stronger empathic concern, while explicitly putting oneself into the shoes of the target (imagine self) induces both empathic concern and personal distress. In one such study, Batson, Early and Salvarini (1997) investigated the affective consequences of different perspective-taking instructions when participants listened to a story about Katie Banks, a young college student struggling with her life after the death of her parents. This study showed that different instructions had distinct effects on how participants perceived the target's situation. Notably, participants who imagined themselves to be in Katie's place showed stronger signs of discomfort and personal distress than participants who focused on the target's responses and This outcome may help to explain why observing a need situation does not always result in prosocial behavior: if perceiving another person in an emotionally or physically painful circumstance elicits personal distress, then the observer may tend not to fully attend to the other's experience and as a result fail to display sympathetic behaviors. Interestingly, cognitive neuroscience research demonstrates that when individuals adopt the perspective of others, neural circuits common to the ones underlying first-person experiences are activated as well. However, taking the perspective of the other produces further activation in specific parts of the frontal cortex that are implicated in executive functions, particularly inhibitory control (e.g., Ruby & Decety, 2003 . In line with these findings, the frontal lobes may functionally serve to separate perspectives, or resist interference from one's own perspective when adopting the subjective perspective of others (Decety & Jackson, 2004 ). This ability is of particular importance when observing another's distress, because a complete merging with the target would lead to confusion as to who is experiencing the negative emotions and therefore to different motivations as to who should be the target of supportive behavior.
In two successive functional MRI studies, we recently investigated the neural mechanisms subserving the effects of perspective-taking during the perception of pain in others. In the first study, participants were shown pictures of hands and feet in painful situations and asked to either imagine themselves or to imagine another individual experiencing these situations and rate the level of pain they would induce . Both the self-perspective and the otherperspective were associated with activation in the neural network involved in pain processing. This finding is consistent with the shared neural representations account of social perception discussed above. However, the self-perspective yielded higher pain ratings and quicker response times, and it involved the pain Decety and Lamm 9 matrix more extensively in the secondary somatosensory cortex, a sub-area of the MCC, and the insula.
In a second neuroimaging study, the distinction between empathic concern and personal distress was investigated in more detail by using a number of additional behavioral measures and a set of ecological and extensively validated dynamic stimuli (Lamm, Batson & Decety, 2007) . Participants watched a series of videoclips featuring patients undergoing painful medical treatment. They were asked to either put themselves explicitly in the shoes of the patient (imagine self), or to focus on the patients' feelings and affective expressions (imagine other). The behavioral data confirmed that explicitly projecting oneself into an aversive situation leads to higher personal distress, whereas focusing on the emotional and behavioral reactions of another's plight is accompanied by higher empathic concern and lower personal distress (Figure 2 ). The neuroimaging data were consistent with this finding and provided some insights into the neural correlates of these distinct behavioral responses. The self-perspective evoked stronger hemodynamic responses in brain regions involved in coding the motivationalaffective dimensions of pain, including the bilateral insular cortices, the anterior MCC, the amygdala, and various structures involved in action control. The amygdala plays a critical role in fear-related behaviors, such as the evaluation of actual or potential threats. Imagining oneself to be in a painful and potentially dangerous situation might therefore have triggered a stronger fearful and/or aversive response than imagining someone else to be in the same situation. Corresponding with Jackson and colleagues (2006) , this insular activation was also located in a more posterior, mid-dorsal sub-section of the area. The middorsal part of the insula plays a role in coding the sensory-motor aspects of painful stimulation, and it has strong connections with the basal ganglia where activity was also higher during the self-perspective. Taken together, these considerations suggest that the insular activity generated in the self-perspective reflects simulation of sensory aspects of the painful experience. Such a simulation might server to mobilize motor areas for the preparation of defensive or withdrawal behaviors, and also instigate the interoceptive monitoring associated with autonomic changes evoked by this simulation process (Critchley et al., 2005) . Such an interpretation also accounts for the activation difference present in the somatosensory cortex. Finally, the higher activation in premotor structures might connect with a stronger mobilization of motor representations by the more stressful and discomforting first-person perspective. Further support for this interpretation is provided by the results of a positron emission tomography study investigating the relationship between situational empathic accuracy and brain activity also found higher activation in medial premotor structures, partially extending into MCC, when participants witnessed the distress of others (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005) . In addition, the study also pointed to the importance of prefrontal areas in the understanding of distress.
Taken together, the available empirical findings reveal important differences in the neural systems involved in first-and third-person perspective-taking, and they contradict the notion that the self and other completely merge in empathy. The specific activation differences in both the affective and sensorimotor aspects of the pain matrix, along with the higher pain and distress ratings, seem to reflect the self-perspective's need for more direct and personal involvement. One key region that might facilitate self versus other distinctions is the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ). The TPJ is activated in most neuroimaging studies of empathy , and it seems to play a decisive role in selfawareness and the sense of agency. Agency (i.e., the awareness of oneself as an agent who is the initiator of actions, desires, thoughts and feelings) is essential for successful navigation of shared representations between self and other (Decety, 2005; .
Thus, self-awareness and a sense of agency both play pivotal roles in empathy and significantly contribute to social interaction. These capacities are likely to be involved in distinguishing emotional contagion, which relies heavily on the automatic link between perceiving the emotions of another and one's own experience of the same emotion, from empathic responses which call for a more detached relation. The neural responses identified in these studies as nonoverlapping between self and other may take advantage of available processing capacities to plan appropriate future actions concerning the other.
Awareness of one's own feelings, and the ability to consciously regulate one's own emotions may allow us to disconnect empathic responses to others from our own personal distress, with only the former leading to prosocial behavior.
Modulation of empathic responding
Despite the fact that the mere perception of the behavior of others activates similar circuits in the self, and -in the case of empathy -for pain neural circuits involved in the first-hand experience of pain, there is also evidence that this unconscious empathic responding can be modulated by various situational and dispositional variables. Research in social psychology has identified a number of these factors, such as the relationship between target and the empathizer, the empathizer's dispositions, and the context in which the social interaction takes place. Accordingly, whether observing the distress of a close friend results in empathic concern and helping behavior or in withdrawal from the situation depends on the complex interaction between these factors.
Emotion regulation seems to have a particularly important role in social interaction, and it has a clear adaptive function for both the individual and the species (Ochsner & Gross, 2005) . Importantly, it has been demonstrated that individuals who can regulate their emotions are more likely to experience empathy, and to interact in morally desirable ways with others (Eisenberg et al., 1994) . In contrast, people who experience their emotions intensely, especially negative emotions, are more prone to personal distress, an aversive emotional reaction (e.g., anxiety or discomfort) that is based on the recognition of another's emotional state or condition.
In the case of perception of others in pain, the ability to down-regulate one's emotions is particularly valuable when the distress of the target becomes overwhelming. For example, a mother alarmed by her baby's cries at night has to cope with her own discomfort in order to provide appropriate care for her distressed offspring. One strategy to regulate one's emotions is based on
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cognitive re-appraisal. This involves reinterpreting the valence of a stimulus in order to change the way in which we respond to it. It can either be intentionally achieved, or it can result from additional information provided about the emotioneliciting stimulus.
In providing different context information about the consequences of the observed pain, Lamm, Baston and Decety (2007) Another intrapersonal factor affecting the empathic response is the emotional background state of the observer (Niedenthal et al., 2000) . For example, a depressive mood can affect the way in which we perceive the expression of emotions by others. In a recent developmental neuroscience study, limbic structures such as the amygdala and the nucleus accumbens became hyperactive when participants with pediatric bipolar disorder attended to the facial expression of emotion (Pavuluri et al., 2006) . Similarly, patients with generalized social phobia showed increased amygdala activation when exposed to angry or contemptuous faces (Stein et al., 2002) .
Whether individual differences in dispositional empathy and personal distress modulate the occurrence and intensity of self versus other-centered responding is currently a matter of debate. Several recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate specific relationships between questionnaire measures of empathy and brain activity. For example, both Singer and colleagues (2004) and Lamm and colleagues (2007) detected significantly increased activation in insular and cingulate cortices in participants with higher self-reported empathy during perception. These findings showed modulation of neural activity in the very brain regions that are involved in coding the affective response to the other's distress.
Note however, that no such correlations were found in a similar study (Jackson et al., 2005) . Also, no correlations with self-report personal distress scores were observed by Lamm et al. (2007) or . However, Lawrence and colleagues (2006) did report such correlations with activity in the cingulate and prefrontal regions of participants who labeled a target's mental and affective state. Part of the discrepancy between the neuroscience research and the dispositional measures may be related to the low validity of self-report measures in predicting actual empathic behavior (Davis & Kraus, 1997; Ickes, 2003) . It is our conviction that brain-behavior correlations should be treated with caution, and care must be taken to formulate specific hypotheses both about the neural correlates of the dispositional measures as well as about what the questionnaire actually measures. For example, scores on the personal distress subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1996) yielded correlations close to zero with the experimentally derived distress measures, and no significant correlations with brain activation. This outcome indicates that the subscale is probably not an appropriate measure of situative discomfort evoked by the observation of another's distress.
The effects of interpersonal factors -such as the similarity or closeness of the empathizer and the target -have been investigated at the behavioral, psychophysiological and neural levels. For instance, Cialdini and coworkers (1997) have documented that perceived oneness -i.e., the perceived overlap between self and other -is an important predictor of helping behavior and correlates strongly with empathic concern. Lanzetta and co-authors (1989) made interesting observations concerning the effects of attitudes on social interaction.
Their studies show that, in a competitive relationship, observation of the other's joy results in distress, whereas pain in the competitor leads to positive emotions.
These findings reflect an important and often ignored aspect of empathy, namely that this ability can also be used in a malevolent way -as when knowledge about the emotional or cognitive state of competitors is used to harm them. A recent study by Singer and colleagues (2006) revealed the neural correlates of such counter-empathic responding. In that study, participants were first engaged in a sequential Prisoner's dilemma game with confederate targets who were playing the game either fairly or unfairly. Following this behavioral manipulation, fMRI measures were taken during the observation of fair and unfair players receiving painful stimulation. Compared to the observation of fair players, activation in brain areas coding the affective components of pain was significantly reduced when participants observed unfair players in pain. This effect, however, was detected in male participants only, who also exhibited a concurrent increase of activation in reward-related areas.
In sum, there is strong behavioral evidence demonstrating that the experience of empathy and personal distress can be modulated by a number of social-cognitive factors. In addition, a few recent neuroscience studies indicate that such a modulation leads to activity changes in the neural systems that process social information. Further studies are required to increase our knowledge about the various factors, processes and (neural and behavioral) effects involved in and resulting from the modulation of empathic responses. This knowledge will inform us how empathy can be channeled into prosocial and altruistic behaviors.
Conclusion
The combined results of functional neuroimaging studies demonstrate that when individuals perceive others in pain or distressful situations, they use the same neural mechanisms as when they are in painful situations themselves. Such a shared neural mechanism offers an interesting foundation for intersubjectivity because it provides a functional bridge between first-person information and third person information, grounded in self-other equivalence (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Sommerville & Decety, 2006) , which allows analogical reasoning, and offers a possible route to understanding others. Yet a minimal distinction between self and other is essential in social interaction in general and for empathy in particular, and new work in social neuroscience has demonstrated that the self and other are distinguished at both the behavioral and neural levels.
Finally, recent cognitive neuroscience research indicates that the neural response to others in pain can be modulated by various situational and dispositional variables.
Taken together, these data support the view that empathy operates by way of conscious and automatic processes which, far from functioning independently, represent different aspects of a common mechanism. These accounts of empathy are in harmony with theories of embodied cognition, which contend that cognitive representations and operations are fundamentally grounded in bodily states and in the brain's modality-specific systems (Niedenthal et al., 2005) .
